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Although the development of a new private sector is generally considered crucial to economic 
transition and development, there has been little empirical research on the determinants of startup 
firm growth.  This paper uses panel data techniques to analyze a survey of 297 new small 
enterprises in Romania containing detailed information from the startup date through 2001.  We 
find strong evidence that access to external finance (loans) increases the growth of both 
employment and sales.  Taxes appear to constrain growth.  There is some evidence that 
entrepreneurial skills increase growth, but only weak evidence for the effectiveness of technical 
assistance, and only when it is provided by foreign partners or international agencies.  A wide 
variety of alternative measures of the business environment (contract enforcement, property rights, 
and corruption) are tested, but are found to have little or no association with firm growth. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
How can policies promote the growth of small startup enterprises in transitional and 
developing economies?  It is hard to overestimate the importance of this de novo private sector to 
the post-socialist economies in particular, where the existing enterprises inherited from central 
planning face difficult if not insurmountable problems in restructuring and adjusting to the demands 
of a market economy.
1  Indeed, many observers have taken development of the new private sector 
as a principal measure of “progress in transition”; see, for instance, the discussions in the annual 
Transition Reports of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the recent World 
Bank (2002) report on “the first ten years” of transition. 
The widespread interest in entrepreneurial start-ups and the policies that affect them, 
however, has not been matched by anything close to a corresponding research effort.  Research on 
East European economies has paid some attention to factors affecting self-employment decisions, 
some of which may be classified as entrepreneurial entry, although no such study has yet been 
published on Romania or on many of the other countries.
2  But what policy-relevant factors 
determine whether the embryonic enterprises, once they have been founded, develop into larger 
firms, creating jobs for workers and producing goods for consumers, or instead languish as tiny 
“mom-and-pop” operations with relatively few externalities for economic development? 
On this question, only scant evidence is available.  In Romania, the focus of our analysis in 
this paper, official statistics are similar to those of other countries in painting an extremely limited 
picture, although they do show that small and medium size enterprises (SMEs, defined as up to 249 
employees) have played a large and growing role in economic activity, accounting for more than 40 
                                                           
1 Kornai (1990) and Murrell (1992) were perhaps the earliest to emphasize the difficulties of restructuring old 
enterprises and the crucial importance of new firm growth to economic transition. Johnson and Loveman (1995) 
examine case studies in Poland, and McMillan and Woodruff (2002) provide a recent overview. 
2 Earle and Sakova (1999, 2000) analyze Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia.   2
percent of the regular work force at the end of 1999, for instance.  Official figures have also 
reported a 27.5 percent reduction in the number of SMEs with positive gross profit from 1997 to 
1999, giving rise to expressions of concern, but they provide little information on the factors 
explaining the growth and health of the sector.
3 
Following the official statistics, most research in transition and developing economies that 
has attempted to address these issues has studied the entire SME sector, including in the analysis 
firms with as many as 250 employees and paying little attention to the smallest category of micro 
enterprises (those with fewer than 10 employees).
4  The larger SMEs in the East European analyses 
are likely to be either inherited state-owned enterprises or spin-offs from such firms, and thus not 
genuinely new start-ups, nor do the data generally provide enough information on the history of the 
firm to permit any evaluation of the firm’s origins.
5  This research has also generally been limited 
to analyzing managerial opinions concerning obstacles to growth, rather than estimating the 
statistical relationship between actual firm growth and objective measures of potential factors 
affecting growth.
6  The sole exception appears to be Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff’s (2000) 
cross-section study of survey data on employment and sales growth from 1994 to 1996 as a 
function of the “normal” reinvestment rate, profitability in the first year of operation, whether the 
firm had a loan before 1996, and a “security of property rights index.”  In OLS and ordered probit 
regressions using the start-up sample with employment greater than 10 and less than 270 (the 
                                                           
3 Figures are taken from National Agency for Regional Development (2000). 
4 In addition to National Agency for Regional Development (2000) on Romania, see, for instance, Earle, Estrin, and 
Leshchenko (1996) and Richter and Schaffer (1996) on Russia.  Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2000 and 2002) 
study survey data from five East European countries, but they exclude micro firms from the analysis, and the average 
employment of their sample of Romanian startups is 45.5.  The focus on the broader SME sector in previous research 
has persisted in spite of the fact that micro firms represent the overwhelming majority of small firms, for example 
accounting for 92.8 percent of all SMEs in Romania in 1999 (National Agency for Regional Development, 2000). 
5 Much of the literature, therefore, identifies the new private sector with the SME sector, although the latter may 
include firms that are neither new nor private.  World Bank (2002) evaluates the performance of 20 or so different 
transition economies using this approach applied to official statistics on the firm size distribution.   3
authors’ preferred sample), none of these variables is estimated to have an effect statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level for either growth measure.  Although the 
results do not prevent the authors from drawing the conclusions that “[a] lack of bank finance does 
not seem to prevent private-sector growth” and that “[m]ore inhibiting than inadequate finance are 
insecure property rights” (p. 1), these issues clearly bear further examination.
7   
Research on developing countries, as reviewed for instance by Liedholm and Mead (1999) 
with respect to the Dominican Republic and several African nations, has included a number of  
quantitative analyses of small firm growth, but the studies involve only cross-sectional data and 
focus on the sector, region, and age of the firm and the gender of the entrepreneur; they are not 
concerned with the effects of policies.
8  As in transition economies, the available data sets on firms 
have been small, few of them containing panel data with objective measures of growth and of 
potential factors affecting growth over the life of the firm, and there has been little use of statistical 
techniques to isolate the effects of individual factors on growth. 
This paper builds on the existing literature to contribute to our understanding of the policy-
relevant determinants of small firm growth.  Compared with previous work, our analysis has 
several advantages.  To begin with, our data permit us to focus on the smallest category of micro 
enterprises – a set of firms that have successfully started up, but whose further growth is far from 
assured.  The data, based on both accounting and survey information, include detailed histories of 
each firm in the sample, permitting a careful distinction of new start-ups from spinoffs and state 
enterprises and providing information for each year over the firm’s life cycle from startup to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
6 See, for instance, Romanian Center for Small and Medium Size Enterprises (1998) and National Agency for Regional 
Development (2000) on Romania; Pissarides, Singer, and Svejnar (2000) on Bulgaria and Russia; and EBRD (1999) on 
several countries.  For a similar study in the U.S., see W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research (1996). 
7 Related work on investment in small firms in Central and Eastern Europe includes Bratkowski, Grosfeld, and 
Rostowski (2000) and Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002), the latter using the same data as in their earlier paper. 
8 Previous research on microfinance, surveyed for instance by Morduch (1999), has focused on the effects on 
consumption and income of borrowers and on school attendance of their children, but not on job or sales growth.    4
interview date, in most cases several years later.  In this study, therefore, we are able to provide the 
first analysis (as far as we are aware) of these issues using panel data, with multiple observations on 
each firm.  These data permit us to make use of statistical techniques to isolate the effects of 
individual factors, taking into account other characteristics of the firm and other factors that may be 
present, including unobserved heterogeneity, and to specify the timing of the relationship between a 
change in some factor (for instance, the availability of finance) and subsequent firm growth. 
Our study is also unusual in considering simultaneously all the major categories of policy-
relevant factors that have been discussed in the literature:  finance (external sources, both formal 
and informal), human capital (skills of entrepreneurs, and the supply and skills of their workers), 
technical assistance (business associations, consultancy, and training programs), and the business 
environment (red tape, contract enforcement, property rights, and corruption).  With respect to each 
of these, our data contain multiple indicators that attempt – insofar as possible – to provide 
objective measures of the factor and its precise timing.  Where objective measures are difficult to 
obtain, particularly with some aspects of the business environment, we also use some estimates by 
managers,  and we supplement our findings on the relationships between objectively measured 
growth and policy-relevant factors with information on managers’ subjective evaluations of these 
relationships.  The aim is to consider a wide variety of alternative measures and dimensions of the 
factors. 
An important problem in this analysis, as in any attempt to draw inferences about the effects 
of potential determinants of firm performance, concerns the identification of causal effects of these 
determinants.  This study handles the problem of inference in several ways.  First, detailed survey 
data permit the analysis to control for relevant third factors.  Second, the focus is on growth rather 
than level of performance, as firm idiosyncrasies are likely to be important determinants of the 
latter.  Third, the study exploits panel data, which facilitate a precise specification of timing so that   5
the effect of a factor is measured after the factor has changed and which permit the use of fixed 
firm-specific effects to control for unobservable heterogeneity.  Finally, the study has devoted much 
effort to examining the robustness of the results to changes in the specifications:  the definitions of 
the dependent variable growth measures and of the independent variables-of-interest, the inclusion 
of alternative sets of control variables, the timing of the relationships, and the controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Section 2 describes the data construction, basic characteristics, and growth performance of 
the sampled firms.  Section 3 analyzes managerial opinions concerning the constraints on growth 
that their firms face.  Section 4 discusses objective measures of four sets of potential growth 
factors:  finance, human capital, technical assistance, and the business environment.  The panel data 
regression methods and results using objective measures of growth rates and policy-relevant factors 
are presented in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of results and caveats. 
 
2.  DATA 
  This paper studies a data set based on a survey of Romanian firms that was conducted in 
May-June 2001.  The survey included a section to be filled out by an accountant, using standard 
Romanian definitions of key concepts (particularly to measure such variables as number of 
employees, sales, profits, reinvested profits, and loans), and a section of questions directed to the 
owner-manager in a face-to-face interview (to measure the number of working entrepreneurs, their 
characteristics and opinions, the receipt of technical assistance, and aspects of the business 
environment).  In this section, we describe the sample, discuss possible selection bias, and provide 
basic descriptive statistics on the sample characteristics and on our measures of employment and 
sales growth.  Our data on the policy-relevant factors potentially affecting growth are discussed in   6
Section 4.
9 
 
2.1  The Sample 
  The sample was designed to cover all firms that had received at least one loan from three 
international loan agencies by March 2000.
10  The motivation for this sample choice was the 
extreme sensitivity of much of the information that had to be collected together with the fact that 
the research team had the support of the agencies in approaching the firms’ owners.
11  Out of a total 
of 386 such firms, 297 were interviewed, with a refusal rate of about 10 percent.
12 
Data from these firms were collected for most variables on an annual basis, from the firm’s 
start date through mid-2001, so that the entire past of each firm could be studied.
13  F o r  t h e  
purposes of this analysis, “start date” was defined as either the date of starting operations after 
founding or of the last major reorganization (split-up, merger, or spin-off of the sample firm). The 
age of the firm (time since start date) is an important variable to control for in the analysis, and its 
distribution is shown in Table 1. 
Table 2 contains the composition of the sample by region, industry, and employment size.  
The distribution by region follows the geographic spread of the loan programs, with particular 
concentration in Banat and the West.  Concerning the industry distribution, nearly half the sampled 
firms operate in wholesale or retail trade, but there is also significant representation in several 
manufacturing sectors, transportation, and a variety of services.  The size distribution reveals that 
                                                           
9 Much more detail about the sample, questionnaire, survey organization, and data processing procedures can be found 
in an appendix available from the authors on request. 
10 The three organizations are the Romanian-American Enterprise Fund (RAEF – Small Loan Program), the 
Cooperative Housing Fundation (CHF – Micro Loan Program), and World Vision (CAPA). 
11 Although loan officers supported interviewers in approaching the firms, the former did not participate in the 
interviews, nor did they receive any firm-level information, the confidentiality of which had to be guaranteed when it 
was collected. 
12 A total of 89 could not be interviewed, for the following reasons:  4 had been bought out, 20 had closed, 5 did not 
have the owner-manager present, 19 could not be found, 9 had had their loan foreclosed and therefore did not 
cooperate, and 32 refused for other reasons.   7
53 percent fall into the “micro” category, with fewer than 10 employees, and an additional 23 
percent have between 10 and 19.  Only 9.1 percent of the firms are “medium,” according to the 
standard definition of 50-249 employees.  Thus, the sample in this study is heavily tilted towards 
the smallest size categories of firms, unlike most other studies of the SME sector. 
An important concern that may arise with respect to our sample is that there is some form of 
“selection bias” in the process determining whether firms receive loans from these loan agencies, 
and therefore that any estimates of the impact of determinants on growth may be biased.  As with 
any nonexperimental design, we cannot entirely exclude the possibility of selection bias, but there 
are a number of mitigating factors to bear in mind.  First of all, most of our determinants are 
measured in continuous variables that show considerable variability within and across firms.  For 
example, considering the role of debt finance, we note that there are many firm-year observations 
when there are no loans, and there is enormous variation in the size of loans in those firm-years 
where they are present. 
Furthermore, as in any study of the effect of a policy, our ambition is limited to assessing 
“the effect of treatment on the treated.”  Thus, again using the example of loans, the relevant 
counter-factual is that the firms in our sample had not received these loans in these years, or that 
they had received smaller or larger loans.  Our use of firm-fixed effects in the estimating equations 
uses variation in growth rates within each sampled firm, rather than comparing loan recipients with 
nonrecipients, to continue that example.  The results from this analysis may be generalized only to 
firms that are similar to those in our sample, and one should be cautious about extrapolations to 
firms lacking a common statistical support.
14  The relevant policy question in this case, however, 
concerns marginal changes: it is not whether loans should be extended to the universe of all firms in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
13 Some variables representing characteristics of the business environment are not time-varying, however, limiting the 
ways in which they can be used in the analysis.   8
Romania, but rather whether the loan program should be increased (or reduced), either by 
increasing the loans that the sample firms receive or by raising the number of firms that receive 
loans.  We believe that our results are informative for this more realistic policy question. 
A final type of selection bias could result from the fact that our database includes only 
surviving firms.  If the factors that increase growth also tend to raise the probability of survival, as 
stands to reason, this suggests that our estimates of the effects will be understated, which is of 
course a caveat about our results. 
 
2.2  Measuring Small Firm Growth 
The standard measure of growth used in past studies of small firms is the change in the 
number of workers since startup, a variable that is relatively easy for respondents to remember and 
that is uncontaminated by price changes (see, e.g., Liedholm and Mead, 1999).  Moreover, job 
creation may be an important social goal, and policies to support small businesses are frequently 
justified on their supposed employment effects (Birch, 1987).
15  This study also emphasizes 
employment growth, but using a modified measure that is arguably more appropriate, and it also 
studies sales growth as an alternative measure.  This section describes the employment and sales 
growth definitions and analyzes how the measures vary with such characteristics as firm age, 
sector, region, and year. 
The definition of employment growth in the present study differs in a number of important 
ways from a simple calculation of the change in the number of workers from the firm’s start-up to 
the date of interview.  To start with, the definition here includes working owners (entrepreneurs), 
since job creation for owners may be equally valuable, from a social point of view, as jobs created 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
14 Heckman et al. (1998) discuss the importance of the common support in estimating treatment effects in the dummy 
treatment variable case. 
15 According to McMillan and Woodruff (2002), “[t]he creation of jobs has been arguably the most important benefit of 
the new entrants” in transition countries.   9
for others.  Workers on external (rather than labor) contracts are also included in the definition, as 
the purpose here is not to distinguish different types of contractual relations.
16  
A still more important feature of the definition of employment growth analyzed here is that 
we study annual growth rates, rather than total change since startup.  The use of annual rates 
permits a much more precise assessment of the timing of employment growth effects, rather than 
cumulating over a long period of time.  Our analysis of the panel data to link, for each firm, the 
timing of employment growth to the changes in factors that may be hypothesized to affect this 
growth.
17  The start-up year is excluded from the analysis because it is typically a highly volatile 
period in which firms may not fully operate and because this creates more comparability with the 
sales growth results, which are plagued by problems of part-year operation during start-up.
18 
Similar principles are applied in our analysis of sales growth, where we study annual rates 
of change in real (PPI-deflated) sales.  Sales are reported cumulatively by year; thus during the 
start-up year they are an unreliable measure of average performance due to the ambiguity of the 
precise date of start-up.  We therefore restrict the analysis of sales growth to data only from the first 
full year of operation.  Unfortunately, information on sales in 2001 is not available, and all analyses 
of sales therefore concern data only through the year 2000. 
Figures 1 and 2 contain graphs of the distributions of annual average growth since the first 
                                                           
16 On the other hand, unpaid family helpers are excluded, both because their relationship is more frequently part-time 
and casual (as well as unpaid) and because they cannot be reliably measured in all years.  An incidental benefit of 
including working owners in the definition is that operating firms then always have strictly positive employment, which 
avoids the problem of zeroes in computing ratios and growth rates.  Note that many of the sample firms have multiple 
working owners (the average is nearly two per firm). 
17 We also examined cross-sectional differences in employment growth, but in this case the measure is scaled 
geometrically, in other words assuming a constant exponential growth rate, with the purpose of creating some 
comparability between firms of various ages.  Results from these cross-sectional regressions are qualitatively similar to 
those reported here, and they are available from the authors on request.  The studies discussed by Liedholm and Mead 
(1999) use cross sections, but appear to analyze employment growth from start-up without scaling by firm age, while 
our method measures job creation per unit of time. 
18 Indeed, a finding reported in Liedholm and Mead's (1999) summary of research on Africa, the tendency for firms 
with a smaller employment in the start-up year to grow more strongly than average subsequently, might be attributable 
to the fact that the smaller firms had not really started up in that first year but then caught up in the year following.   10
full year of operation after start-up for employment and sales, respectively.   Overall, growth 
performance was very strong, with average employment growth about 8 percent and average sales 
growth about 9 percent.  Growth performance varied quite considerably across these firms, 
however.  While most firms grew on average, a significant subset experienced no growth or 
declined.  At the top end, 10 percent of firms experienced employment growth averaging over 30 
percent a year, and 10 percent had sales growth over 50 percent.  Thus, the sample contains enough 
variation for the study to be able to relate growth to potential determinants.
19 
Table 3 shows that growth rates vary significantly by year, with a general decline over much 
of the period.  To some extent, the decline may be reflecting the recession of the late 1990s in 
Romania, and it may also reflect age effects:  as the firms in the sample grow older, their growth 
rates follow a typical life cycle decline.  This pattern suggests not only that age and year should be 
controlled for in the statistical analysis, but also that our search for the growth effects due to factors 
such as loans or technical assistance faces an uphill battle in the face of the life cycle effect. 
 
3.  MANAGERS’ OPINIONS OF GROWTH CONSTRAINTS 
Most studies of factors explaining small firm growth rely on managers’ survey responses 
concerning their perceptions of constraints.  The problem with such an approach is that the 
responses to survey questions are clearly subjective and sometimes self-serving; therefore they 
cannot be taken as conclusive evidence.  Nevertheless, such questions do permit the issues to be 
phrased directly, which is a particular advantage when it is difficult to design objective measures of 
factors.  As a supplement to the analysis of objective factors and growth measures, opinions of 
entrepreneur-managers were also collected in this project, and they are reported in this section. 
The phrasing of the questions involved listing a total of 14 constraints and asking the 
                                                           
19 Growth rates by region, industry, year, and age also vary, and we control for them in the analysis.   11
respondents to rate the degree to which he/she believed that the factor constrained their own firm’s 
growth.  Four sets of factors are analyzed: 
•  Finance:  capital constraints, lack of collateral, and level of taxation. 
•  Non-financial inputs:  difficulties in hiring appropriate employees and in finding adequate 
premises and supplies. 
•  Malfunctioning of the business environment:  poor contract enforcement, administrative burden 
of taxation, bureaucratic interference, police protection and private protection payments, and 
unfair competition. 
•  Macroeconomic climate:  inflation and low demand for goods and services provided by the 
firm. 
The assessment on these factors is measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates not 
binding at all and 5 indicates extremely binding.  For many purposes, little information is lost by 
grouping scores 1-3 together as non-constraining or neutral factors and scores 4-5 as “very 
constraining” or “extremely binding” obstacles, and the results for the percentage of firms reporting 
scores 4-5 are presented in Table 4.  Results are provided for firms by category of growth rate 
(below and above the median) and by category of employment size (“micro” = 0-9, “small” = 10-
49, and “medium” = 50-249, following the official categories in Romanian legislation).  In addition, 
respondents ranked the top five “most constraining” factors, and the results are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Financial Constraints 
A common finding in studies of managerial opinions in small businesses is that managers 
feel the firm is capital-constrained.
20  The opinions expressed in our survey were quite consistent, 
showing that financial factors rank highly in managers’ opinions on constraints in Romania.  As   12
shown in Table 4, about 78 percent of firms considered lack of capital as a very constraining factor, 
and the percentage was higher in slow-growing firms and those in the smaller size categories.  Lack 
of collateral was taken as a serious barrier to accessing credit by 42 percent,
21 although in this case 
faster growing firms were more likely to cite it as a constraint, while there is no clear relationship 
with size.  The high level of taxation, which may reduce the possibility of internal finance as an 
alternative to costly external sources, was considered an important constraint by nearly all firms 
(91.1 percent), with comparatively little variation by growth rate or size.
22  As shown in Figure 3, 
more than half of the firms reported either lack of capital or the level of taxation as the “most 
constraining” factor of all. 
 
Labor and Material Inputs 
It is sometimes claimed that well-functioning markets for labor and other production inputs 
have been slow to develop in the transition economies.  Educational systems designed to serve the 
pursuit of rapid industrialization may be poorly adapted to producing skills appropriate to a market 
economy, and soft budget constraints may keep resources bottled up in unproductive sectors of the 
economy.  These problems could be particularly acute for small firms and new entrants that would 
like to expand.  In the current study, about one-third of entrepreneur-managers mentioned hiring as 
a severe constraint, the problem reportedly greater for slow-growing firms and for micro and small 
firms.  The availability of non-labor inputs, such as buildings and land, appears to be even less 
serious, as 18 percent of firms reported difficulties in finding and renting adequate premises 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
20 See, for instance, Pissarides, Singer, and Svejnar (2000) on Bulgaria and Russia and Barlett and Bukvic (2001) on 
Slovenia.  EBRD (1999) uses a four-point scale, with four implying the highest level of constraint, and reports an 
average score of 3.11 for financing for start-ups in 1997-99 across 22 transition economies. 
21 The same percent was obtained in a study carried out by the Romanian Center for Small and Medium Enterprises 
(1998) in 1996, suggesting there has been little change in collateral demands of the main credit providers. 
22 The survey used for the EBRD (1999) report finds an average score on “taxes and regulation” of 3.26 for all countries 
and 3.55 for Romania, but unfortunately does not distinguish tax level, administrative burden of taxation, and other 
regulatory burdens.   13
(buildings), and about 11 percent were concerned about the reliability of supplies.
23  These factors 
were seldom mentioned on the list of worst constraints. 
 
Business Environment 
In order to assess the business environment, respondents were asked to report the degree of 
constraint associated with a variety of factors concerning contract enforcement, administrative 
burden of taxation, bureaucratic interference, police protection and private protection payments, 
and unfair competition.  Some recent studies have argued that these factors are particularly 
important barriers to small firm development.
24 
The survey results, again shown in Table 4, indicate that only 17.7 percent of entrepreneurs 
consider that at least one type of contract enforcement (with either customers or suppliers) is a very 
binding or serious constraint.  Moreover, protection payments to the police and private parties 
(mafias), which threaten property rights, are evaluated as serious problems by only trivial numbers 
of firms.  Constraints associated with bureaucratic interference are somewhat higher, with about 
one-third of firms reporting serious problems, a fraction that is higher in slower growing and 
smaller enterprises; about 5 percent of firms reported this problem as the most constraining they 
faced.  Nevertheless, by these conventional measures, the business environment appears to be less 
constraining than recent claims suggest. 
More important in these managerial opinions is the allegation that some competitors receive 
unfair advantages on the market, with about 47 percent of firms considering unfair competition a 
                                                           
23 The problem appears to be greater for SMEs elsewhere in the region.  Pissarides, Singer, and Svejnar (2000), for 
example, report that 52 percent of the Russian and 55 percent of the Bulgarian managers in their sample considered that 
“getting land, office space and buildings” was a very important constraint; the data pertain to 1995, still very early in 
transition, however, compared to the present study's information on Romania in 2001.  EBRD (1999) returns fairly low 
values for “infrastructure”: an average of 2.07 for all countries, and 2.51 for Romania. 
24 See EBRD (1999) and Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2000, 2002).   14
binding factor.
25  Whether competition is evaluated as “unfair” could certainly involve some 
subjectivity, but in the Romanian context it may reflect the presence of subsidies or regulations 
favoring larger, state-owned firms (particularly regii autonome) or jealousy over special 
preferences granted to foreign investors, which have been quite controversial in the country.  Also, 
Romanian mass media often report cases of unfair benefits received by firms with strong political 
connections.  About 6 percent of firms report this factor as the most constraining. 
Still more substantial is the view that the administrative burden of taxation is an important 
constraint, with 90 percent of managers so reporting.  This variable is unusual in studies of small 
firm growth, as the level and administrative burden of taxation are rarely distinguished.
26  But it 
does represent an aspect of the environment for business that may be influenced by government.  In 
any case, despite the fact that most managers take a dim view of the complexities of the tax code, 
few cite it as one of the most constraining factors, implying that it is relatively less important than 
some of the others. 
 
Macroeconomic Climate 
Inflation was viewed by most firms as a very important constraint, and about 30 percent 
cited it as the single most constraining factor, as shown in Figure 3.  Low demand for the firm’s 
products was cited as a constraint by 37 percent, but it was one of the most important factors for 
very few firms.  These results suggest that, to small firms, macroeconomic stability is viewed as 
more important than demand growth; apparently most of these firms believe they have a market, 
but they require a stable environment to be able to make pricing and other business decisions. 
 
                                                           
25 The Romanian Center for Small and Medium Enterprises (1998) report a similar response in their study using 1996 
data.  Unfair competition was reported to be the second most serious constraint on sales. 
26 Administrative burden is also not the typical measure of the business environment employed by studies such as 
EBRD (1999) and Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2000, 2002).  As noted above, EBRD (1999) combines “taxes 
and regulations” into a single category.   15
4.  OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF POTENTIAL FACTORS AFFECTING GROWTH  
This section presents our measures of factors that may promote or constrain the growth of 
the sample firms.  We refer to these measures as “objective,” and for the most part the variables do 
refer to quantities that may be independently verified and that are defined according to generally 
accepted and interpersonally comparable metrics.  Some of the variables, however, result from 
questions in which manager-owners were asked to estimate some factual condition or circumstance.  
Such measures are particularly important in the business environment section of the survey, when 
respondents were asked about various aspects of government regulation and interference, contract 
enforcement, property rights, and corruption.  With respect to these estimated variables, however, 
our method remains the same – to investigate their effects on firm growth in a multivariate panel 
framework – and thus the empirical strategy differs from the standard analysis of managerial 
opinions concerning growth constraints presented in the previous section. 
Our classification of potential growth factors emphasizes policy-relevant variables and 
draws upon previous research on one or another aspect of these issues.  The four sets of factors, in 
our classification, are as follows: 
•  Finance:  all sources of capital – retained earnings, conventional bank lending, informal credit 
markets, “fiscal facilities” offered by the state, and international aid programs. 
•  Human capital:  education, experience and other characteristics of both entrepreneurs and their 
workforces, including training and constraints on hiring.   
•  Technical assistance:  membership in a business association and training and consultancy 
programs from a variety of sources. 
•  Business environment:  competition, red tape, contract enforcement, property rights and 
corruption. 
Each of these factors has been the subject of considerable discussion, but no prior study has   16
considered all of them simultaneously and attempted to evaluate their relative importance on firm 
growth performance.  In this section, we present our measures for each set of factors in turn. 
 
4.1  Finance 
Financial constraints on the start-up and growth of new ventures have received much 
attention in the transition economies.  While some studies have shown a clear role for financial 
constraints in entrepreneurial start-up, the importance of finance for the subsequent growth and 
performance of small firms has been more controversial.
27  Some recent studies have argued that 
financial constraints are either unimportant, or much less important than other factors.
28 
The measures of financial constraints studied here include the size, number, and source of 
loans, the rate and amount of reinvested profit, and the extent of access to “fiscal facilities” 
lowering taxes.  Starting with loans, the Romanian survey sample includes only firms that have 
received a loan from a USAID-supported program; thus all these firms have received at least one 
loan.  Not every firm received a loan every year, however; indeed in most years of their operations, 
the sample firms had no loans whatsoever.  Moreover, some firms received larger loans than others.  
The amount of loans therefore varies considerably both across firms, and over time for each firm. 
Tables 5 and 6 provide information on the incidence and size of loans, measured as a ratio 
to employment and sales.
29  Only from 1999 did the percentage rise over 50, and it peaked at 75 
                                                           
27 Earle and Sakova (1999, 2000) analyze the impact of finance on entry into entrepreneurship. 
28 See, for example, EBRD (1999); Bratkowski, Grosfeld, and Rostowski (2000); Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff 
(2000 and 2002).  On the other hand, Pissarides, Singer, and Svejnar (2000) find that the managers in their samples 
report the lack of external finance to be a serious constraint.  In this previous research, only Johnson, McMillan, and 
Woodruff (2000) estimate growth equations similar in spirit to ours, but their framework is cross-section with growth 
measured from 1994 to 1996, their sample excludes micro enterprises, and the external financial indicator is a simple 
dummy variable for whether the firm ever received a loan prior to 1996. 
29 The size of the loan is measured as the sum of the amounts in the second half of the previous year and the first half of 
the current year.  The amounts are determined by the extent to which the loan expands financial possibilities in that 
year, defined as the full amount of the loan in the first half year of disbursement and declining linearly over the term of 
the loan thereafter.  These calculations assume that the loan is repaid in equal installments continually over the term, 
which seems to be the most common practice.  We also estimated the equations with a variety of alternative 
specifications, for instance the magnitude of loans in year t-1, with very similar results to those reported here.   17
percent in 2000, falling to 68 percent in 2001.  The mean loan per employee is generally about 
$3000, and when the lei value of sales is converted at current exchange rates, the mean loan amount 
is about 70 percent of sales; for Romanian firms, these are substantial loans.
30 
An alternative to external finance is reinvesting profits.  Table 7 shows the variation in the 
percentage of profit that firms report reinvesting.  About 25 percent of the firms never reinvest in 
any year, but the average rate among the rest is high.  The fraction of firms reinvesting is higher 
earlier in the period, but the average rate among those reinvesting is fairly constant at about 80 
percent. 
The relevant notion of profits for reinvestment purposes is net or after-tax profits; thus the 
extent to which firms have profits to reinvest is influenced by their tax rates.  A particularly 
interesting policy in this respect has been the granting of so-called “fiscal facilities,” which may be 
given for a variety of reasons and under a variety of programs.  Most of these involved tax 
reductions (60 percent reduce the profit tax and another 15 percent reduce import or export taxes), 
and seven percent involve credits.  Unfortunately, the value of these benefits is difficult to quantify, 
but Table 7 shows the percentage of firms reporting receiving them and their number by year.  
About 90 percent of the sample did not receive any facility in any given year, but those who did had 
extra financial resources that they could use to grow. 
 
4.2  Human Capital 
Although it is frequently claimed that the transition economies of Eastern Europe started the 
process with relatively strong human resources due to well-developed educational systems, it is less 
clear that the skills of the population were well-geared toward entrepreneurial endeavors or toward 
                                                           
30 Concerning the sources of finance, informal loans from family, friends, and loan sharks account for a rather small 
percentage of the total (about 3.5 percent), while formal loans from banks and international organizations account for 
95 percent.  Interfirm credit also plays only a small role for our sample firms, in contrast to McMillan and Woodruff’s 
(1999) analysis of firms in Vietnam.   18
responding to the demands of the market rather than central planners and factory bosses.  Table 8 
shows some characteristics of entrepreneurs in our data.  These are computed by taking the share-
weighted average across owners for each year and for each firm, averaging these across years for 
each firm, and then averaging across firms.  The figures thus give the average percentage ownership 
by each characteristic.
31 
The Table shows that women own an average of about 30 percent, while only 0.7 percent is 
accounted for by foreigners.  Most entrepreneurs are new to the industry in which their firms 
operate, as 59 percent worked outside the industry prior to starting up the firm.  Entrepreneurs tend 
to be well educated, with 49 percent having completed some form of university education, and an 
additional 32 percent had completed academic secondary schools.  The age distribution is given in 
Figure 6.  Most entrepreneurs are in their 30s and early 40s, and an unusually low fraction is over 
50 years old.
32 
The survey also collected information on workers’ characteristics, including their 
educational attainment.  By contrast with their employers, few employees had university education:  
12.6 percent, about the national average.  About 33 percent of workers had not finished high school. 
A final human capital measure is a proxy variable for the difficulty of hiring, analogously to 
the managerial opinion variable on this topic in Section 3.  Our measure is the respondent’s 
estimate of the costs of hiring an additional worker, including all the time spent advertising, 
interviewing, selecting, and training a new employee.  The range of this variable is from zero to 480 
hours, with a mean of 45.9 and median of 24.0.  The survey also asked about initial training costs, 
measured in time; the mean was 54 days for a newly hired unexperienced worker, and 22 days for 
                                                           
31 If each firm had a single, unchanging entrepreneur, this would correspond to the percentage of entrepreneurs, but 
with multiple entrepreneurs holding differential ownership stakes, it is important to take into account these weights in 
estimating the relative importance of each characteristic.   19
those with some experience.  In some specifications, we summed the hiring and training times to 
obtain a measure of the total cost. 
 
4.3  Technical Assistance 
Much effort and many financial resources have been expended on the design of technical 
assistance programs for small firms in transition economies, but rather little evidence is available 
on how well these programs have functioned.  Rather few firms in our data report actually having 
received technical assistance:  about 30 percent overall, 10 percent receiving only training, 9 
percent receiving only consulting, and 10 percent receiving both. 
Although relatively few firms have received technical assistance, those that do tend to 
receive multiple services.  The types of services received, source of financing, and service providers 
are shown in Table 9.  Most common are consulting in marketing and training of entrepreneurs and 
workers.  About half the services were paid for by the firm itself, while USAID accounts for only 
13.5 percent.  Both domestic and foreign/international providers are represented in our data. 
Respondents were also asked to rate the usefulness of each instance of technical assistance 
on a three-point scale (“not useful at all,” “somewhat useful,” and “very useful”).  Despite the low 
incidence of technical assistance, the recipients rate what they have received very highly, 75.0 
percent of services being rated “very useful” and an additional 21.5 percent “somewhat useful.”  
These subjective ratings, while informative, cannot be equated with evidence of a positive effect of 
receipt of technical assistance services on the firm’s growth rate.  Such evidence requires 
multivariate analysis of factors explaining growth, including technical assistance. 
Donors have actively promoted business associations as an important way to promote SME 
development.  Only 28.5 percent of the firms in the sample are members, however.  Members 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
32 The study also investigated a variety of other characteristics of entrepreneurs, including their family backgrounds and 
their experience prior to 1990 (including political background), but these variables were unassociated with measured   20
report wanting to be a part of business associations for several purposes, the most common being 
consulting services, locating customers and suppliers, and training.  Many of the other firms report 
not being members because the services are not useful or membership is not worth the cost. 
 
4.4  Business Environment 
The final set of factors concerns the environment within which firms operate:  costs of 
registration and problems with bureaucracy, use of the courts and other means to handle disputes, 
predatory behavior from police and private parties, and the extent of under-reporting of financial 
indicators.
33  An important problem in this field is ensuring accurate indicators for these problems, 
and the survey attempted a wide variety of alternative measures, only some of which are discussed 
here. 
The costs of registration are frequently used as a measure of bureaucratic interference into 
small firm operation.  In the Romanian case, the approval of three different agencies was necessary 
during most of the period we are studying:  the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Protection, and the Registry of Trade and Commerce.  It is frequently maintained that bribes 
are either necessary or useful for expediting the registration process, and our questionnaire asked 
respondents to estimate the distribution of the total monetary cost among official payments, 
unofficial payments (bribes), and consulting fees (which might also be partly bribes).
34  Official 
payments account for 90 percent, consulting fees for 7 percent, and bribes only about 3 percent, 
according to firm reports. 
The survey also collected information on the number of permits required for the firm to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
firm performance in this data set. 
33 IRIS (2000) contains a detailed discussion of legal procedures, regulation, and taxation of small businesses in 
Romania. 
34 Anecdotal evidence suggests that bribes are frequently paid indirectly, through a third party; for instance, a lawyer or 
other agent may be hired to carry out the registration, and part of the “fee” paid to this agent may end up in the hands of 
the bureaucrat.  Most surveys of corruption fail to measure this channel.   21
operate in the first year after founding and the number of government inspections that took place 
that year.  While most firms needed relatively few permits and received a moderate number of 
inspections (in both cases defined as less than ten), some firms experienced more bureaucratic 
hassles.
35 
Most firms have disputes with customers or suppliers at some time or other in their history, 
but an interesting question is how the disputes are handled.  Survey respondents were asked to 
specify the dispute-resolution methods they had used in the past and the single method they would 
most likely use in the future.  The results show that going to court is common (58.6 percent of firms 
report having done so, and 37.7 percent say this would also be the most likely future method), but 
still more common is resolving never to deal with the party again. 
To elicit truthful responses on protection payments, firms were asked to specify the 
incidence in their sector.  Only about 7 percent of firms say “rather yes” to the statement that it is 
sometimes necessary for firms in the sector to make such payments to either private parties or the 
police. 
Respondents were also asked whether they were willing to pay for a clean business 
environment.  The results from 282 respondents is that 77 percent claimed they were willing to pay, 
and the amounts they reported to be willing to pay were not inconsequential (5-10 percent of sales).  
A final indicator is truthful reporting.  If a firm has little to fear from predatory government 
bureaucrats or private mafias, it is more likely to truthfully report financial indicators.  Firms were 
asked to estimate the extent of under-reporting by “other firms in the same industry and region.”  
The results show that an average of 24 percent of employment, 32 percent of wages, 28 percent of 
                                                           
35 IRIS (2000) claims that it was not only the number of required permits that bothered firms, but also the cost of 
preparing the necessary documentation to get permits; the median amount of time preparing documentation for the 
Trade Registry was seven days, for example.  In the current survey, the median respondent reported a total of 30 days 
of work for filling out forms and dealing with the Trade Registry, the fiscal authorities, and the Labor Chamber in order 
to be able to operate, but this variable was unassociated with subsequent firm growth.   22
profits, and 25 percent of sales are said to go unreported.  According to these measures, the hidden 
economy is quite substantial in Romania.
36 
 
5.  ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 
This section reports regression results relating employment and sales growth to the four 
types of factors, while controlling for other relevant variables: firm age, past and current 
reorganizations (two dummies, one for mergers and acquisitions, and the other for split-ups and 
spin-offs), size category, size of the city where the firm is located, industry, region, and year 
dummies.  One might expect growth rates to decline with age and size.  By definition, mergers and 
acquisitions should be associated with growth, and split-ups and spin-offs with contraction.  Firms 
in larger cities may have more growth opportunities.   Industry and regional dummies control for 
demand and other factors not otherwise included, and year dummies control for macroeconomic 
shocks.  The regressions are based on a 1994-2001 panel, since the number of observations is very 
small in 1992 and 1993.  The equations we estimate are all variants on the following basic form: 
yit = β1Financeit-1 + β2HumanCapitalit-1 + β3TechnicalAssistanceit-1 + β4BusinessEnvironmentit-1  
+ γ1Ageit + γ2Reorganizedi + γ3FirmSizeit-1 + γ4CitySizei + γ5Industryi + γ6Regioni  
+  αt  + αi  + εit  , 
where the β are the parameters of interest corresponding to policy-relevant factors, and the γ reflect 
the impact of controls.  In alternative versions of this equation, yit stands for employment and sales 
growth – ln(Eit/Eit-1) and ln(Sit/Sit-1) – and different specifications of the policy-relevant factors are 
employed.  Summary statistics for these variables, which are based on those discussed in Section 4, 
above, are provided in Table 23, and precise definitions may be found in the data appendix.   
                                                           
36 A recent paper estimating the size of the shadow economy labor force as a percentage of the working age population 
in 22 transition countries reports a figure of 24.3 percent in Romania, just above the Central and East European average 
of 23.3 percent (Schneider, 2002).   23
Nontime-varying controls, which are subscripted only with an i, drop out of the equation when the 
firm fixed effects αi  are included, as does the age variable, when both  αt  and αi  are included.  In 
most specifications we include the αi to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, but as some 
business environment measures are contemporaneous or refer to the firm’s startup period, we also 
estimated every equation by OLS.  As is well-known, OLS is more robust in the presence of 
measurement error. 
We estimated hundreds of versions of this equation, varying with the choice of variables, 
timing, controls, and use of firm fixed effects.  Some representative results from these estimations 
are provided in Tables 11-14.  Table 11 displays the results of the pooled OLS and firm fixed 
effects base specifications.  Tables 12, 13, and 14 show results from alternative specifications of the 
financial, technical assistance, and business environment factors, respectively.   
The results in Table 11 demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between the 
amount by which a firm’s financial constraint is relaxed by loans in one year and the increase in 
employment and sales in the next.  We exploited the fact that the data contain detailed information 
on the timing of all the firm’s loans to construct alternative loan measures.  In particular, we 
examined the effect of average loans over the years t-1 and t and those in the second half of year t-1 
and the first half of year t.  The results were very similar to those presented here.
37  
“Fiscal facilities” provided by the state consistently and substantially raise employment 
growth.  The presence of fiscal facilities in one year increases employment growth by 0.08 in the 
fixed effects specification, suggesting that the high statutory tax rates represent a significant 
financial constraint on small firm employment expansion.  This is consistent with the opinions 
expressed by about one quarter of entrepreneurs that the level of taxation is the most constraining 
                                                           
37 We say “average” over this period because our measure assumes that the degree to which the financial constraint is 
relaxed declines linearly over the term of the loan; thus, we calculate the average of this “relaxation rate.”    24
factor for the development of their firm. 
The proportion of reinvested profit has no significant relationship with either employment 
or sales (Table 12), however, despite the fact that each year more than half of the firms in the 
sample reported reinvesting some of their profit.  This suggests that rather than being a substitute 
for external funds, reinvested profit is a fallback solution.  And since firms’ reported net profits 
tend to be quite low, they may not be earning sufficiently high levels to meet their investment 
needs.
38  Trade credit also shows an insignificant influence.  So far, the results support the 
proposition that financial constraints are highly significant for the sample firms, as an increase in 
external financial resources has a positive impact on both employment and sales growth.   
The effects of the human capital variables on employment and sales growth are weaker in 
general than those for financial constraints.  There is a strong positive relationship, however, 
between the entrepreneur’s level of education and employment growth in the fixed effects 
specification.  Most of the impact comes from high school graduation.  Also, there is evidence that 
entrepreneurs whose prior work experience is inside the firm’s industry, males, and foreigners are 
more successful at raising employment growth.  These relationships do not show up for the sales 
growth, however.  The negative, slightly convex relationship between both growth measures and 
age, found in the OLS specifications, disappears once firm fixed effects are added.  The results for 
worker education show no precisely estimated effect. 
Technical assistance is associated with faster employment growth in the OLS equation, but 
the estimated coefficient becomes statistically insignificant when firm fixed effects are added.  As 
shown in Table 13, there is some evidence of a positive effect of technical assistance only when it 
comes from a foreign partner or international organization, and only is the impact of the latter 
                                                           
38 Though net profit is surely underreported, that probably does not fully explain the low numbers.  Note that the 
entrepreneurs reported that only 28 percent of profits were not reported on average.      25
marginally statistically significant (at the 10 percent level) when firm fixed effects are added – and 
only in the employment growth regression.  None of the variables shows a positive effect on sales 
growth once firm fixed effects are added.  The combination of sometimes positive OLS and 
insignificant fixed effects results suggest that the firms with better growth opportunities received 
technical assistance, but that the technical assistance itself had no impact. 
Finally, regressions were run using many different measures of the business environment, 
including measures of corruption, competition, permits, inspections, and problems with contract 
enforcement and property rights.
39  Among hundreds of alternative specifications investigated, no 
evidence was found that these variables constrain growth.
40  To some extent the comparative lack 
of strong results in this area may simply reflect the difficulty of finding reliable measures of the 
relevant concepts, particularly time-varying measures for each firm, but the results at least provide 
a caveat for policies and programs that would reallocate resources towards business environment 
issues at the expense of providing finance in Romania. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS  
Although the importance of small startup companies for economic growth and innovation is 
widely recognized in all types of economies – developed, developing, and transitional – there has 
been relatively little research into the policy-relevant factors that stimulate their growth.  Studies of 
managerial opinions concerning the obstacles faced by their firms are useful and suggestive, but we 
believe that there is a need for careful quantitative studies using panel data to analyze the statistical 
                                                           
39 The survey provides about 30 alternative measures of the business environment, not counting measures of 
competition.  The regressions attempted various combinations of these, using cross-section as well as panel 
specifications, and alternative sets of controls (including very parsimonious equations with few or no controls). 
40 Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2000) similarly find little evidence of a relationship between property rights 
enforcement and growth in Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, which they report to have significantly better property 
rights enforcement than Russia or Ukraine.  One interpretation of the evidence is that below a certain level of property 
rights protection, the policy emphasis should be on improving protection, but once protection has reached a certain 
level, improving access to finance may have a bigger payoff for growth.   26
relationship between firm growth and objective measures of factors related to policies.  In this study 
we have attempted to begin to fill this gap, using a remarkable data set with detailed information 
over the entire lifespans of firms.  Here we summarize the conclusions from our analysis of these 
data, and we also discuss caveats that are important in interpreting our work and that suggest how 
future research may proceed. 
The results provide strong evidence that loans are an important factor in stimulating the 
growth of small startup firms in Romania.  Internal finance and trade credit appear to be relatively 
unimportant in accounting for firm growth. This finding, which is highly robust to alternative 
specifications and methods of estimation, runs counter to the claims of some recent studies that 
finance is not an important constraint for small firm growth in Eastern Europe.  Among the 
financial determinants of growth, “fiscal facilities” provided by the state consistently and 
substantially raise employment growth, suggesting that the statutory tax rates represent a significant 
financial constraint on small firm expansion.
41 
Other factors tend to be weaker and much more sensitive to specification.  Concerning 
human capital, the findings suggest that the entrepreneur’s level of education and prior experience 
in the industry is positively associated with higher employment growth.  Having a male or foreign 
entrepreneur is also associated with employment growth. 
Concerning technical assistance, only that received from foreign partners or international 
agencies appears to be in any way related to growth.  In general it appears that firms that were 
growing anyway were receiving technical assistance, but the actual assistance had little additional 
impact.   
A final set of policy-relevant variables concerns competition, contract enforcement, 
property rights, and other aspects of the business environment. Although transition economies have   27
stimulated fascinating discussions of these issues, the analysis in this project reveals that the 
relationship between measures of the business environment and firm performance is weaker than it 
is for the other factors.  Among many variables investigated – including measures of corruption, 
permits, inspections, and problems with contract enforcement and property rights – little or no 
evidence was found that they constrain growth. 
These policy conclusions are of course subject to a number of caveats.  First of all, the 
specific conclusions are limited to the sample of firms analyzed in this study.  All of these firms are 
unusual, at least in the sense that they received a USAID-sponsored loan, and thus their average 
quality may reasonably be supposed to be higher than the average in the entire universe of small 
Romanian enterprises.  Although our use of fixed effects controls for quality differences among the 
sample firms, extrapolating the study’s exact findings to a broader category of firms requires an 
assumption that the factors that influence growth are similar in both cases. 
On the other hand, our assessment, as in any policy analysis, is limited to “the effect of 
treatment on the treated.”  Using the example of loans, the relevant counter-factuals are that the  
firms in our sample had not received these loans in these years, or that they had received smaller or 
larger loans.  The results may be generalized only to firms that are similar to our sample firms.  The 
relevant policy question, however, is not whether loans should be extended to the universe of all 
firms in Romania, but rather whether the loan program should for example be doubled in size, 
either by doubling the loans that the sample firms receive or by doubling the number of firms that 
receive loans.  If small firms in Romania are indeed capital-constrained, as our evidence strongly 
suggests, then we doubt that the next 300 or so firms in the queue for finance would differ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
41 The Romanian government has recently removed many of these facilities.   28
materially from the 300 who did receive the USAID loan.  Thus, for such policy questions, our 
results may provide some guidance.
 42 
Concerning sample size, the number of firms and years in this study is larger than in most 
other studies of firm performance in transition economies, but it is still small enough to suggest 
caution in interpreting the results.  The use of time series information on each firm and the focus on 
micro enterprises – which are advantages of this study relative to other research is this area – 
mitigate the problem to some extent, but not entirely.  For instance, the estimates of the number of 
jobs created by loans fluctuate depending on the precise measures and statistical methods employed 
in the analysis.  The positive association of higher employment growth and receipt of loans is 
strongly supported by the data, but the precise point estimates of the magnitude of job creation 
should be treated with caution. 
The strength of our conclusions is also limited by measurement difficulties.  With respect to 
the business environment, for example, the extent to which contracts are enforced and the degree to 
which property rights are respected are variables that are difficult to measure.  Although we 
collected information on a wide variety of alternative measures and explored many different ways 
of estimating their effects, the finding of little relationship between these variables and firm growth 
may simply reflect the difficulty of measurement.   
Inferences concerning the association of firm growth with the potential factors may also be 
limited by lack of variation in the sample.  To take the business environment variables again as an 
example, it is possible that their variation within Romania is insufficient to be related to differences 
in growth rates.  Perhaps all firms are equally constrained by these factors.  In fact, however, the 
                                                           
42 Moreover, a possible implication of a systematic quality difference between our sample and population of Romanian 
firms could be, assuming that firms of lesser quality tend to be more credit-constrained, that our estimated positive 
effect of loans on growth is actually understated relative to the population average effect.  For the business 
environment, however, the possible bias may go in the other direction if successful firms are more subject to 
bureaucratic and other forms of predation, implying that our estimated zero effect is if anything overstated.   29
survey data do show fairly substantial variation in both the business environment measures and in 
growth rates. 
The final caveat concerns the limits of statistical methods to yield causal conclusions.   
While the study has made every effort to isolate the effects of individual factors and to estimate 
their magnitudes, in particular through the use of panel data techniques and careful specification of 
the timing of the relationships, the possibility of reverse causality remains.  For instance, it is 
possible that firms with superior growth prospects tend to receive bigger loans; in this case, the loan 
effect would result from careful selection by loan officers, rather than through relaxation of the 
financing constraint (and monitoring of the firm’s behavior).  Our understanding is that loan 
applications are typically evaluated based on the level of the firm’s past performance, rather than 
the particular project for which the loan would be used, and our use of firm fixed effects would 
control for this form of selection bias.  Moreover, our identification of growth spurts in the period 
immediately following the receipt of a loan is strong evidence that the loan is the driving force in 
increasing growth, rather than vice versa, but we cannot entirely exclude the possibility that some 
dynamic selection mechanism also plays an important role.   30
APPENDIX:  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
GROWTH MEASURES 
Employment Growth is the log of the ratio of current employment to employment in the previous 
year, where employment level is defined as the sum of regular workers, contract workers, and 
working entrepreneurs. 
Sales Growth is the log of the ratio of sales in the current year to sales in previous year, where 
sales level is calculated in 2000 prices, in ROL, using PPI at 2-digit CAEN aggregation level. 
CAEN is the Romanian National Classification for Economic Activities. 
 
FINANCE 
1 Year Lagged Amount of Loans is the log of the average amount of loans in year t-1, scaled by 
the average of employment in year t-1 and t-2 (in employment growth regressions) or by average 
sales in year t-1 and t-2 (in sales growth regressions). The average amount of loans in year t-1 is the 
average of the first and second six-month periods in year t-1. The amount in any six-month period 
is the full amount received in that period, plus a fraction of not yet matured loans received in 
previous periods, where the amount declines linearly until maturity.   
Reinvested Profit is the proportion of net profit reinvested in year t-1. 
Number of Fiscal Facilities is the total number of fiscal facilities received in year t-1. 
Proportion of Materials Bought with Trade Credit is the average proportion of materials bought 
with trade credit in year t-1. 
 
HUMAN CAPITAL 
Entrepreneur’s Experience in Other Industry is the average proportion of shares in year t-1 held 
by individuals who worked in another industry prior to owning shares in the firm. 
Entrepreneur’s Age is the average age of individual owners in year t-1, weighted by their 
proportion of shares. 
Entrepreneurs with High School is the average proportion of shares in year t-1 held by 
individuals whose highest educational attainment is a high school education. 
Entrepreneurs with University is the average proportion of shares in year t-1 held by individuals 
whose highest educational attainment is a university education. 
Foreign Entrepreneurs is the average proportion of shares in year t-1 held by foreign individuals. 
Female Entrepreneurs is the average proportion of shares in year t-1 held by females. 
Workers with High School is the proportion of workers on regular contracts in mid-2001 whose 
highest educational attainment is a high school education. 
Workers with University is the proportion of workers on regular contracts in mid-2001 whose 
highest educational attainment is either a short or long-term university education.  
 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
Number of Technical Assistance Services is the number of services in year t-1.   31
Number of Training Services is the number of training services in year t-1. 
Training for Workers/Managers is the number of training services for workers/managers in year 
t-1. 
Number of TA Paid by Firm is the number of services paid by the firm in year t-1. 
Number of TA from Government/NGOs/Foreign/International Organizations is the number of 
services provided by each source in year t-1.  
 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
Proportion of Permits Not Obtained is the proportion of permits that the firm did not have, but 
should have had by law in year t-1. 
Number of Permits/ Inspections in First Year of Operation is a dummy equal 1 if the number of 
permits/ inspections needed during the first year of operation was greater than 9. 
Disputes per Year is the number of contract disputes that could not be resolved through direct 
negotiations that the firm has ever had, divided by the number of years in operation. 
Dummy for Protection Payments to Private Parties/ Police/ Government Officials is a dummy 
equal 1 for firms in the same industry making protection payments to each party in mid-2001. 
Unofficial Payments is the sum of the Private Party, Police, and Governmental Officials dummies.  
Payment for a Clean Environment is the proportion of sales the firm was willing to pay to 
operate in a clean business environment. 
Proportion of Sales Sold with Trade Credit is the proportion of sales sold with trade credit in 
year t-1. 
Proportion of Overdue Receivables is the amount of overdue receivables as a proportion of sales 
in year t-1. 
 
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRM (REGRESSION CONTROLS) 
Age of Firm is the age of the firm since start date (either start-up date in the case of new firms with 
no antecedents in state-owned enterprises or the date of the reorganization of a former state 
enterprise). 
Reorganization is a dummy equal 1 if the firm was founded as a result of the reorganization of a 
pre-existing firm (i.e., if the firm was spun-off from another entity or founded on the basis of a 
split-up or merger). 
Spin-off is a dummy equal 1 if the firm spun-off assets in year t-1. 
Acquisition is a dummy equal 1 if the firm made an acquisition in year t-1. 
Industry Dummies include Heavy, Wholesale, Retail Trade of Food, Nonfood Retail Trade, 
Transportation, Light, and Other Services (1-digit CAEN level of aggregation). 
Regional Dummies include South, Banat, West, Center, Moldova, and Bucharest. 
City Size is the log of the population of the city where the firm is located.   32
 
REFERENCES 
Barlett, Will, and V. Bukvic, “Barriers to Small Business Growth in Slovenia,” Working Paper 
based on Phare-ACE Project P97-8089-R, 2001. 
Birch, David, Job Creation in America, New York:  Free Press, 1987. 
Bratkowski, Andrzej, Irena Grosfeld, and Jacek Rostowski, “Investment and Finance in De Novo 
Private Firms:  Empirical Results from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland,” Economics of 
Transition, Vol. 8(1), 101-116, 2000. 
Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS), “Red Tape Analysis. Regulation 
and Bureaucracy in Romania,” Bucharest, 2000. 
Earle, John S., Saul Estrin, and Larisa Leshchenko, “Ownership Structures, Patterns of Control, and 
Enterprise Behavior in Russia,” in S. Commander, Q. Fan, and M.E. Schaffer (eds.), Enterprise 
Restructuring and Economic Policy in Russia, Washington:  World Bank-EDI, 1996. 
Earle, John S., and Zuzana Sakova, “Entrepreneurship from Scratch,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 
79, 1999. 
Earle, John S., and Zuzana Sakova, “Business Start-ups or Disguised Unemployment?  Evidence on 
the Nature of Self-Employment from Transition Economies,” Labour Economics, Vol. 7(5), 575-
601, September 2000. 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), “Transition Report 1999: Ten Years 
of Transition,” London: EBRD, 1999. 
Heckman, James, Hidehiko Ichimura, Jeffrey Smith, and Petra Todd, “Characterizing Selection 
Bias Using Experimental Data,” Econometrica, Vol. 66(5), 1017-1098, September 1998. 
Johnson, Simon, and Gary Loveman, Starting Over in Eastern Europe:  Entrepreneurship and 
Economic Renewal, Boston:  Harvard Business School Press, 1995. 
Johnson, Simon, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff, “Entrepreneurs and the Ordering of 
Institutional Reform,” Economics of Transition, Vol. 8(1), 1-36, 2000. 
Johnson, Simon, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff, “Property Rights and Finance,” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 92(5), 1335-1356, December 2002. 
Kornai, Janos, The Road to a Free Economy.  Shifting from a Socialist System:  The Example of 
Hungary, New York:  W.W. Norton, 1990. 
Liedholm, Carl, and Donald C. Mead, Small Enterprises and Economics Development:  The 
Dynamics of Micro and Small Enterprises, London and New York:  Routledge Studies in 
Development Economics, 1999. 
McMillan, John, and Christopher Woodruff, “Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in 
Vietnam,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114(4), 1285-1320, 1999. 
McMillan, John, and Christopher Woodruff, “The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition 
Economies,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16(3), 153-170, Summer 2002. 
Morduch, Jonathan, “The Microfinance Promise,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVII, 
1569-1614, December 1999.   33
Murrell, Peter, “Evolution in Economics and in the Economic Reform of the Centrally Planned 
Economies,” in Christopher C. Clague and Gordon Rausser (eds.), Emerging Market Economies in 
Eastern Europe, Cambridge:  Basil Blackwell, 1992. 
National Agency for Regional Development, The Private Sector of Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises in Romania:  Report, Bucharest:  National Agency for Regional Development, 2000. 
Pissarides, Francesca, Miroslav Singer, and Jan Svejnar, “Objectives and Constraints of 
Entrepreneurs:  Evidence from Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Russia and Bulgaria,” 
EBRD Working Paper No. 59, November 2000. 
Richter, Andrea, and Mark E. Schaffer, “The Performance of De Novo Private Firms in Russian 
Manufacturing,” in S. Commander, Q. Fan, and M.E. Schaffer (eds.), Enterprise Restructuring and 
Economic Policy in Russia, Washington:  World Bank-EDI, 1996. 
Romanian Center for Small and Medium Size Enterprises, “The Private Sector of Small and 
Medium Size Enterprises in Romania.  Annual Report 1997,” Bucharest, 1998. 
Schneider, Friedrich, “The Size and Development of the Shadow Economies of 22 Transition and 
21 OECD Countries,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 514, June 2002. 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, “Assessment of the Importance of Small 
Business to Kalamazoo County’s Economy and the Adequacy of Services to Nurture Small 
Business Formation.”  Kalamazoo: Upjohn Institute, 1996. 
World Bank, Transition – The First Ten Years:  Analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union, Washington:  World Bank, 2002. 
   34
Figure 1: Average Annual Employment Growth 
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Figure 2: Average Annual Sales Growth  
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Figure 3: Managerial Opinions about Factors Creating the 
Largest Growth Constraints 
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Table 1: Start Date (Year of Starting Operation 
or Last Major Reorganization) 
 
Year Number  of 
Firms 
Percent of 
Firms 
1989 4  1.4 
1990 3  1.0 
1991 32  10.8 
1992 41  13.8 
1993 34  11.4 
1994 64  21.5 
1995 25  8.4 
1996 25  8.4 
1997 26  8.8 
1998 25  8.4 
1999 18  6.1 
Sample Size: 297. 
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Table 2: Sample Composition 
 
  Number of Firms  Percent of Firms 
Region    
Banat 94  31.6 
West 64  21.5 
Center 54  18.2 
Moldova 17  5.7 
South 58  19.5 
Bucharest  10 3.4 
Industry    
Light Industry   61  20.5 
Heavy Industry   27  9.1 
Trade 142  47.8 
Transportation 22  7.4 
Other Services   45 15.2 
Number of Employees     
 0 – 1  9  3.3 
 2 – 4   52  18.9 
 5 – 9   86  31.3 
10 – 19   64  23.3 
20 – 29   20  7.3 
30 – 39   8  2.9 
40 – 49   11  4.0 
50 – 59   7  2.5 
60 –69   5  1.8 
70 +  13  4.7 
Sample Sizes: 297 for Region, 297 for Industry, and 275 for Number of Employees. 
Notes: Banat includes the counties of Caras Severin, Mehedinti, and Timisoara; West 
includes Arad and Cluj; Center includes Alba, Hunedoara, Mures, and Sibiu; Moldova 
includes Buzau, Galati, and Iasi; South includes Arges, Constanta, and Dolj. Bucharest 
is the capital. 
  3-digit activities are grouped into 5 categories: Light Industry (food, beverages, 
textile, confection, shoes, leather, furniture, paper, publishing, construction services); 
Heavy Industry (chemical, rubber, plastic, metal parts, electric equipment, and 
instruments, recycling metallic materials, other products from minerals and metals); 
Trade (wholesale, retail food, retail non-food); Transportation; Other Services 
(accommodation and catering, real estate, repair, communication and education, 
information technology, unclassified service for firms and individuals). 
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Table 3: Average Growth by Year 
 
Year Employment  Sales 
 Average 
Growth 
Sample 
Size 
Average 
Growth 
Sample 
Size 
1994  0.08        54  0.18  48 
1995 0.25  103  0.28  103 
1996 0.16  168  0.32  170 
1997 0.18  194  0.03  194 
1998 0.18  222  0.13  219 
1999 0.08  246  0.17  244 
2000 -0.02  271  0.03  268 
2001  0.01  271        n.a.  n.a. 
Average Annual   0.07  238  0.11  248 
Note:  Firms are included from age 2 onwards. 
 
 
 
   38
Table 4: Managerial Opinions about Growth Constraints 
 
 All  
 Firms Growth Rate    Firm Size   
Type of Factor 
  Slow  Fast      Micro   Small  Medium
Finance 
   Lack of capital  77.7 82.6  70.4 80.8  77.1  64.0
   Lack of collateral  41.5 35.8  45.4 37.6  43.8  36.0
   Level of taxation  91.1 92.7  88.9 92.8  86.7  96.0
Inputs 
    Hiring difficulties   32.6 39.8  27.8 33.1  35.2  24.0
    Difficulties finding premises  18.4 22.9  17.6 23.2  18.1  8.0
    Unreliable supplies  11.0 15.6  5.6 13.6  11.4  8.0
Business Environment   
    Poor contract enforcement  17.7  18.9   17.0 8.3  28.2  4.0
    Admin. burden of taxation  90.8  91.7   88.0 89.6  89.5  96.0
    Bureaucratic interference  33.3  35.2   29.6 35.5  32.4  28.0
    Unfair competition  46.8  49.1   37.4 41.9  51.0  41.7
    Police protection payments  2.5  4.6    0.9 5.6  0.0  0.0
    Private protection payments  1.8  2.8    0.9 3.2  1.0  0.0
Macroeconomic Factors   
   Inflation  84.8 90.8  79.6 92.0  81.9  68.0
   Low product demand  37.2 47.2  29.9 45.2  32.7  16.0
       
Sample Size     282  217  255 
Note:  Respondents were asked to rate the degree to which they believed that the factor constrained 
their own firm’s growth.  The degree is measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates not binding 
at all and 5 indicates extremely binding.  In the table scores 1-3 are grouped together as non-
constraining or moderately constraining factors and scores 4-5 as “very constraining” or “extremely 
binding” obstacles.  “All firms” includes the entire sample; “slow” and “fast” growth refer to below- and 
above-median employment growth, respectively; and “micro,” “small,” and “medium” are defined as 
employment 0-9, 10-49, and 50-249, respectively. 
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Table 5: Incidence and Mean Size of Loans/Employment 
 
Year  Percentage Firms 
Receiving Loans 
Mean Loan for 
Recipient Firms 
Mean Loan for All 
Firms 
Sample 
Size 
1994 25.0  1843.2  460.8  16 
1995 21.2  2218.6  470.6  33 
1996 27.9  3573.5  999.1  93 
1997 27.1  8481.4  2298.2  155 
1998 37.1  3847.5  1426.6  178 
1999 51.5  2659.4  1368.4  206 
2000 75.0  2793.9  2095.4  236 
2001 67.9  2222.6  1510.3  259 
Note: Loans are measured in USD. 
 
 
Table 6: Incidence and Mean Size of Loans/Sales 
 
Year  Percentage Firms 
Receiving Loans 
Mean Loan for 
Recipient Firms 
Mean Loan for All 
Firms 
Sample 
Size 
1994 19.1  8.5  1.6  21 
1995 22.5  13.4  3.0  40 
1996 26.8  16.8  4.5  97 
1997 25.8  44.2  11.4 163 
1998 35.3  25.9  9.2 187 
1999 51.5  27.4  14.1 206 
2000 74.4  41.4  30.8 238 
2001 66.0  20.1  13.3 256 
Note: Loans are measured in USD and sales in million ROL, in 2000 prices. In 2000, the average 
exchange rate was 21,700 ROL per USD.    40
 
Table 7:  Reinvestment Rates and Fiscal Facilities 
 
 Reinvestment  Rates    Fiscal Facilities 
Year 
Rein- 
vestment  
Rate 
Percent 
Firms 
Reinvest-
ment>0 
Sample 
Size 
Average 
Number of 
Facilities 
Percent 
Firms 
Receiving 
Facilities 
Sample 
Size 
1992 55.0  75.0  4  n.a  n.a  n.a 
1993 55.0  71.4  7  n.a  n.a  n.a. 
1994 71.4  84.6  39  1.8  10.3  39 
1995 62.1  75.0  80  1.5  10.0  80 
1996 55.7  66.7  114  1.4  7.9  114 
1997 56.3  69.1  178  2.3  9.6  178 
1998 49.5  59.6  203  2.0  8.9  203 
1999 42.0  50.4  228  1.8  10.9  228 
2000 43.2  52.4  254  1.4  11.0  254 
2001 n.a  n.a  n.a  1.4  7.9  279 
 
 
Table 8: Characteristics of Entrepreneurs 
 
Entrepreneur’s Characteristics  Average Percent 
Ownership 
Female   29.9 
Foreigner 0.7 
Experience in Other Industry  59.1 
High School Education  30.3 
University Education  49.0 
Sample Size: 293. 
Note: Entrepreneurs’ characteristics are weighted by the share 
ownership of each individual owner. Organizational owners are 
excluded. 
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Table 9: Characteristics of Technical Assistance 
 
   Percent of All Services 
Type  
Accounting 8.6 
Legal 7.8 
Business Plan Writing  11.2 
Marketing 15.5 
Use of New Technology  11.6 
Information and Technology  1.3 
Management 9.9 
Training of Entrepreneurs  15.1 
Training of Workers  15.9 
Other 3.0 
Financing Source   
Romanian Government  2.2 
Romanian Foundation  1.7 
Business Association  13.0 
Paid by Firm  50.4 
Foreign or International 
Organization 
13.0 
USAID   13.5 
Other Source  6.1 
Service Provider   
Local Governmental Agency  4.4 
Central Governmental Agency  6.1 
Romanian NGO  20.1 
Romanian Firm or Freelancer  29.7 
International Organization  27.1 
Foreign Organization or Individual 10.5 
Other 2.2 
Sample Sizes: 232 for Types, 230 for Financing sources, and 229 for 
Service Providers. 
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Table 10: Variables in the Regressions:  Policy-relevant Factors 
 
Variable Mean  Standard   
Deviation 
Financial    
1 Year Lagged Loan  Amount/Employment  1622.65  4674.47 
1 Year Lagged Loan Amount/Sales   9.53  20.85 
Number of Fiscal Facilities  0.18  0.61 
Percent of Profit  Reinvested  50.85  45.20 
Percentage of Materials Bought with Trade Credit  37.00  32.62 
Entrepreneurs' Characteristics     
Female   0.30  0.41 
Foreigner 0.01  0.06 
Experience in Other Industry  0.57  0.47 
High School Education  0.28  0.43 
University Education  0.48  0.47 
Age 40.80  8.55 
Workers' Education     
Percent of Workers with High School   54.23  34.72 
Percent of Workers with University  12.53  19.36 
Technical Assistance     
Number of Consulting and Training Services  0.12  0.43 
Number of Services Paid by Firm  0.06  0.27 
Number of Training Services  0.04  0.20 
Membership in a Business Association  0.28             
TA from Government  0.01            0.11 
TA from NGOs  0.02            0.13 
TA from Foreign Source  0.01            0.08 
TA from International Organization  0.03            0.17 
Business Environment     
Percent of Permits not Obtained   2.33  10.51 
Average Number of Disputes per Year  0.26  1.15 
Payment for a Clean Environment   0.08  0.15 
Percent of Sales Sold with Trade Credit  30.45  34.53 
Overdue Receivables as Percentage of Sales  14.23  21.32 
Number of Permits in First Year of Operation   0.42   
Number of Inspections in First Year of Operation  0.21   
Unofficial Payments to Private Parties  0.07   
Unofficial Payments to Police  0.06   
Unofficial Payments to Government Officials  0.28   
Note: The following are dummies. Numbers of permits and inspections in the first year of 
operation has a value of 1 if the firm reported more than 9 permits and inspections, 
respectively. Unofficial payments has a value of 1 if the firm reported that such payments 
were made.   43
Table 11: Determinants of Growth:   Base Specification 
 
Employment Growth    Sales Growth   
OLS  Fixed Effects OLS  Fixed Effects 
Financial:        
  1 Year Lagged Loan Amount   0.027 
(2.04) 
0.064 
(4.14) 
4.417 
(1.54) 
7.921 
(2.84) 
  Number of Fiscal Facilities  0.043 
(2.27) 
0.080 
(2.39) 
0.006 
(0.21) 
-0.005 
(-0.08) 
Entrepreneurs’ Characteristics:        
  Experience in Other Industry  0.030 
(1.10) 
-0.599 
(-2.54) 
0.083 
(1.27) 
-0.035 
(-0.06) 
 Age  -0.015 
(-1.87) 
0.024 
(0.61) 
-0.047 
(-2.20) 
-0.023 
(-0.24) 
 Age
2  0.000 
(1.51) 
-0.000 
(-0.85) 
0.000 
(1.94) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
 Education:        
  High  School  0.007 
(0.18) 
0.508 
(2.12) 
0.036 
(0.42) 
0.517 
(1.00) 
  University    0.024 
(0.60) 
0.715 
(2.34) 
-0.007 
(-0.07) 
0.510 
(0.80) 
 Foreign  -0.247 
(-0.54) 
1.185 
(1.99) 
0.056 
(0.11) 
0.994 
(0.89) 
 Female  -0.025 
(-0.80) 
-0.555 
(-2.74) 
0.012 
(0.18) 
-0.262 
(-0.57) 
Workers’ Education:      
 High  School  0.058 
(1.38)    0.040 
(0.47)   
 University  -0.048 
(-0.51)    -0.117 
(-0.62)   
Technical Assistance Number  0.065 
(1.99) 
0.044 
(1.22) 
0.035 
(0.88) 
-0.003 
(-0.04) 
N  1052 807 
R
2  0.095 0.018  0.089 0.008 
Note: T statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. Though not reported here, the fixed 
effects regressions include the firm’s age, dummies for acquisitions and spin-offs, two size-category dummies, 
and year dummies. Besides these, the OLS regressions also include the population of the municipality, a 
dummy for reorganized firms, six sector dummies, and five regional dummies.  
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Table 12: Determinants of Growth:  Alternative Specifications of Financial Factors 
 
Employment Growth      Sales Growth   
OLS  Fixed Effects  N    OLS  Fixed Effects  N  Equation 
Number 
 
Variables of Interest  Coeff. R
2 Coeff. R
2     Coeff. R
2   Coeff.  R
2  
Amount of Loans   0.027 
(2.03) 
0.065 
(4.17) 
4.46 
(1.55) 
8.298 
(2.97)  1 
Proportion of Reinvested Profit  0.010 
(0.35) 
0.095 
-0.025 
(-0.54) 
0.017 1052  
-0.032 
(-0.50) 
0.089
-0.156 
(-1.62) 
0.007 807 
Amount of Loans  0.027 
(2.04) 
0.064 
(4.15) 
4.447 
(1.56) 
8.004 
(2.86)  2 
Proportion of Materials Bought 
with Trade Credit 
0.017 
(0.45) 
0.095 
-0.070 
(-0.40) 
0.017 1052  
0.035 
(0.45) 
0.089
0.166 
(0.39) 
0.008 807 
Amount of Loans  0.027 
(2.03) 
0.065 
(4.18) 
4.489 
(1.57) 
8.355 
(2.98) 
Proportion of Reinvested Profit  0.010 
(0.34) 
-0.026 
(-0.57) 
-0.032 
(-0.50) 
-0.154 
(-1.59) 
3 
Proportion of Materials Bought 
with Trade Credit 
0.017 
(0.44) 
0.095 
-0.078 
(-0.45) 
0.017 1052  
0.035 
(0.44) 
0.089
0.012 
(0.28) 
0.008 807 
Note: T statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. The fixed effects regressions also include the firm’s age, dummies for acquisitions 
and spin-offs, two size-category dummies, and year dummies. Besides these, the OLS regressions include the population of the municipality, a dummy for 
reorganized firms, six sector dummies, and five regional dummies.   
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Table 13: Determinants of Growth:  Alternative Specifications of Technical Assistance 
 
Employment Growth    Sales Growth   
OLS Fixed  Effects  N  OLS Fixed  Effects  N  Equation 
Number 
 
Variables of Interest  Coeff. R
2   Coeff. R
2   Coeff.  R
2   Coeff.  R
2  
1  Dummy for Technical 
Assistance 
0.066 
(1.32)  0.093  0.030 
(0.50)  0.017 1052  0.026 
(0.35)  0.089  -0.057 
(-0.43)  0.007 807 
2  Number of TA Paid by Firm  0.054 
(1.39)  0.092  0.036 
(0.63)  0.017 1052  0.071 
(1.20)  0.089  0.049 
(0.44)  0.009 807 
3  Number of Training Services  0.094 
(1.42)  0.093  -0.058 
(-0.64)  0.017 1052  0.177 
(1.98)  0.090  0.011 
(0.06)  0.008 807 
Training for Workers  0.142 
(1.73) 
0.032 
(0.26) 
0.132 
(1.46) 
-0.060 
(-0.23)  4 
Training for Managers  0.033 
(0.28) 
0.093 
-0.168 
(-1.22) 
0.017 1052 
0.231 
(1.35) 
0.090 
0.087 
(0.32) 
0.008 807 
5  Dummy for Membership in a 
Business Association 
-0.009 
(-0.35)  0.094     1048  -0.035 
(-0.68)  0.090     803 
Number of TA from 
Government 
-0.122 
(-0.76) 
-0.248 
(-1.52) 
0.275 
(1.60) 
0.265 
(0.69) 
Number of TA from NGOs  0.019 
(0.20) 
0.024 
(0.21) 
-0.095 
(-0.93) 
-0.167 
(-0.62) 
Number of TA from Foreign 
Source 
0.259 
(2.08) 
-0.047 
(-0.19) 
0.395 
(2.80) 
0.209 
(0.41) 
6 
Number of TA from Int’l 
Organization 
0.106 
(1.80) 
0.095 
0.160 
(1.73) 
0.019 1052 
-0.144 
(-0.98) 
0.093 
-0.089 
(-0.44) 
0.009 807 
Note: T statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. The fixed effects regressions also include the firm’s age, dummies for acquisitions 
and spin-offs, two size-category dummies, and year dummies. Besides these, the OLS regressions include the population of the municipality, a dummy 
for reorganized firms, six sector dummies, and five regional dummies.   
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Table 14: Determinants of Growth:  Alternative Specifications of the Business Environment 
 
Employment Growth    Sales Growth   
OLS  Fixed Effects  N  OLS  Fixed Effects  N 
Equation 
Number 
 
Variables of Interest  Coeff.   R
2   Coeff.  R
2    Coeff.    R
2   Coeff.  R
2  
1  Proportion of Permits not 
Obtained 
-0.008 
(-0.05)  0.095  -0.256
(-0.73)  0.018  1052 0.231 
(0.90)  0.090  0.950 
(1.38)  0.008  807 
2  Number of Permits in First 
Year of Operation 
-0.006 
(-0.24)  0.103     1019 0.047 
(0.78)  0.094     779 
3  Number of Inspections in First 
Year of Operation 
0.035 
(1.09)  0.101     1035 0.082 
(1.14)  0.096     793 
4  Disputes per Year  0.003 
(0.49)  0.095     1052 0.006 
(0.61)  0.089     807 
5  Payment for a Clean 
Environment 
-0.036 
(-0.59)  0.095     996 0.013 
(0.11)  0.090     762 
6 Unofficial  Payment  -0.014 
(-0.83)  0.097     1042 -0.046 
(1.26)  0.093     798 
Dummy for Private Protection 
Payments 
-0.044 
(-1.03)    -0.138 
(-1.19)   
Dummy for Police Payments  -0.040 
(-0.90)    -0.083 
(-1.01)    7 
Dummy for Payments to 
Governmental Officials 
0.009 
(0.29)
0.097 
  
1042 
0.007 
(0.10)
0.094 
  
798 
8  Proportion of Sales Sold with 
Trade Credit 
0.046 
(1.15)
0.096 0.354
(1.35)
0.021 1052  0.113 
(1.42) 0.091  0.065 
(0.12) 0.009  807 
Proportion of Sales Sold with 
Trade Credit 
0.035 
(0.72) 
0.257
(0.85) 
0.095 
(0.99) 
0.301 
(0.49) 
Overdue Receivables as 
Proportion of Sales 
0.032 
(0.50) 
0.255
(0.70) 
0.047 
(0.29) 
-0.677 
(-0.88)  9 
Proportion of Materials Bought 
with Trade Credit 
0.008 
(0.19) 
0.096 
-0.011
(-0.05) 
0.020 1052 
0.015 
(0.19) 
0.091 
0.091 
(0.21) 
0.008 807 
Note: T statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. The fixed effects regressions also include the firm’s age, dummies for acquisitions 
and spin-offs, two size-category dummies, and year dummies. Besides these, the OLS regressions include the population of the municipality, a dummy 
for reorganized firms, six sector dummies, and five regional dummies.  
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